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An editorial in the September 23, 1998 Issue of The New York Times describes the possible analytic 
fallacies in the United States Government's (USG) decision to target the Shifa plant in the Sudan. 
Language and reasoning in the editorial seem suspect. 
 
By terming Shifa a pharmaceutical plant, the editorial uses language that inevitably mitigates against the 
US analysis and decision. Moreover, that Shifa is officially termed a pharmaceutical plant by the 
Sudanese government and might actually produce veterinary medicines and agricultural chemicals may 
have no bearing on activities related to chemical warfare agent production. 
 
Moreover, the editorial advocates that even if Shifa was involved in chemical warfare production along 
with more innocuous activities, the USG should offer to replace any lost production of agricultural and 
veterinary products lost in the missile attack. How would one know how much was lost? Why from the 
very folks who would be authorizing chemical warfare activities. With "appropriate" estimates of loss, 
the Sudanese Government could completely subsidize its chemical warfare activities or even turn a 
profit. Nice work if you can get it. (See Beroggi, G.E.G., & Wallace, W.A. (1997). The effect of reasoning 
logics on real-time decision-making. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A: 
Systems and Humans, 27, 743-749; Dubious decisions on the Sudan. (September 23, 1998). The New 
York Times, p. A30; Fink, K. (1995). Projection, identification, and bi-logic. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 64, 
136-152; Keene, G.B. (1995). The psychology-logic overlap. Behavior and Philosophy, 23, 57-62; Morris, 
A.K., & Sloutsky, V.M. (1998). Understanding of logical necessity: Developmental antecedents and 
cognitive consequences. Child Development, 69, 721-741.) (Keywords: Intelligence, Shifa, Sudan, 
Terrorism.) 
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